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Wartime Gain in Equivalent Fulitime Employment due to Increase in Hours
(parttime and overtime combined): United States, April 1940-1946
1940194119421943194419451946
AGRICULTURE
1 Av. weekly hours 54.055.056.760.056.153.552.6
2 Employed persons
(millions) 8.7 8.9 9.1 8.8 8.4 8.7 8.2
3 Manhours (millions) 470490 516528 471 465 431
4 Equivalent fuiltime em-





6 Av, weekly hours 40.041.543.546.546.145.642.9
7 Employed persons
(millions) 37.339.643.Z45.045.344.945.9
8 Manhours (millions) 1492164319012093208820471969













GAIN IN EMPLOYMENT DUE TO ROURS INCREASES
14 Compared with 1940
(millions) +1.4+3.8+7.6+6.5+5.5+2.5
15 Compared with 1941
(millions) +2.4+6.2+5.1+4.1+1.1
Source of data on which the calculations were based: Bureau of Census, Current
Population Surveys. Fulltime hours were assumed to be 53 a week in agriculture, 42
a week in nonagriculture.
due to overtime (Table 11, line 4) rose rapidly during 1940-43, slightly
in 1944, and fell off somewhat by 1945, though they were offset in
some degree during 1944 and 1945 by the time lost through continued
dilutions of the labor force with women and young people.
7DEMOBILIZATION
Between mid- 1944 and 1945, Canada's armed forces discharged a fifth
of their personnel. Its labor force failed to keep pace with population
46Table 10
Change in Equivalent Fuiltime Employment due to Change in Extent of





1 0* 42* 1.0 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.4 1.3
2 7 35 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.7
3 25 17 4.9 5.0 5.2 4.1 5.6 6.0
Equivalent Fuiltime Workers
4Lost through parttime 3.8 3.5 4.0 3.5 4.9 5.1
Gained through Reduction of Parttime
5 Compared with 1940 +0.3—0.2+0.3—1.1—1.3
6 Compared with 1941 —0.5 0—1.4—1.6
Source of data on which calculations are based: Bureau of Census, Current Popula-
tion Surveys.
*Have a job but not at work.
growth, and during the rest of 1945 shrank rapidly. By autumn 1946 it
had returned to the 1941 proportion of population. The armed forces
still held a few thousand men (Chart 1).
Britain's combined industrial and military labor force touched its
summit in late 1943. When the armed forces began to let personnel go
home after V-J Day, it'was a quarter demobilized. Many workers leav-
ing manufacturing and mining did not abandon the labor force but
shifted to transport, nonessential construction, services, and distribution.
By early 1947 the labor force had lost its war gains, though the armed
ranks were still somewhat larger than before the conflict.
The United States yielded up a bit of its excess labor force in the two
months before V-E Day; by V-J Day a third had disappeared. The armed
forces did not stop inducting until almost the end and still held several
Table 11
Wartime Gain in Equivalent Fulitime Employment due to Overtime
United States, April 1940-1945 (millions)
IGain due to increased hours
(Table 9, line 14) 1.4
2Less gain due to decreased parttime
(Table 10, line 5) 0.3
GAIN DUE TO OVERTIME
3Compared with 1940 1.1
4Comparedwith 1941


















47million men in late spring 1946 when the labor force had returned to
peacetime proportions. As in Canada, the civilian sector was overdis-
banded. After 1946 the total labor force stayed above the prewar pro-
portion of population, unemployment was less than 4 percent of the
labor force, and the armed forces still retained over a million men.
During the 12 or 18 months after victory the labor force tended to
anticipate the precipitous flight from military service.
Very little can be discovered about the labor force demobilization of
Germany during the months following the defeat. Official enumerations
made in 1946 covering all four zones of occupied Germany, plus Berlin,
disclosed that the combined labor fprce proportion of population 14 and
older, standardized for age and sex, was 4 percent below the labor force
participation in the same areas in May 1939. (Wirtschaftswissenschaft-
liches Institut der Gewerkschaften, Deutschland in Zahien, 1950 [Köln,
1951] pp. 12-13, 31.) The fact, however, that this deficiency was much
larger than in the United States, Britain, or Canada could have been
due (a) to the postwar industrial disorganization of Germany, (b) to
the possession by Germans of far more money than they could spend,,
in view of the restricted quantity of goods offered at controlled prices, or
(c) to the taking of the census in late October, by which time the labor
force may have lost many agricultural helpers normally at work in May,
the month in which the prewar count was made.
8THE KOREAN WAR AND POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER EXPANSION
At the threshold of the Korean conflict, in April 1950, the labor force
contained 63.5 million workers42 of which 1.3 million were in the armed
The monthly figures for April 1940 through April 1951 are from Census Current
Population Surveys and rest on interviews with about 25,000 households. The accu-
racy of sample surveys is always suspect and the 1950 enumeration of the nation's
households does nothing to settle them, for a preliminary release, also resting on a
sample though a much larger one, reports 3.5 million fewer in the April 1950 labor
force on the basis of,the same concept and measurement technique (Series PC-i,
No. 2, April 11, 1951, pp. 1-2). The Census ascribed the cause of this paradoxical
discrepancy to the poor quality and inexperience of the 130,000 temporary inter-
viewers as well as their responsibility for questions on housing, income, and agricul-
ture. The Survey enumerators, in contrast, were a "small, well-trained group with,
on the average, more than 12 months of specialized experience in the enumeration
of the labor force.... Aswas the case a decade earlier, when the monthly survey
results were compared with the 1940 Decennial Census data, it appeared that the
more skilled interviewers had had greater success in handling the labor force ques-
tions for population groups whose activity is difficult to measure and, in consequence,
48